|
|
|
Ronald E. Richman, Esq.
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Michael S. Melbinger, Esq.
Winston & Strawn
35 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601-9703
|
2002-07A
ERISA SEC.
3(37)
|
|
|
Dear Messrs. Richman and Melbinger:
|
|
This responds to your request on behalf of the Anchor Glass
Container Corporation (Anchor) and the Glass, Molders, Pottery,
Plastics & Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (GMP)
for an advisory opinion under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA). Specifically, you asked
whether the Glass Companies Multiemployer Pension Plan (Plan) is a
“multiemployer plan” within the meaning of section 3(37) of
ERISA. For the reasons discussed below, the Department of Labor
(Department) has concluded that the Plan is not a multiemployer plan
within the meaning of section 3(37).
|
|
The following facts and representations are based on your
submissions, as well as submissions of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC). Anchor has been in the business of making glass
containers for over 50 years. During that time, Anchor has grown
into a significant employer in the glass container manufacturing
industry, in part through the acquisition of other glass container
manufacturing companies. Currently, it employs approximately 3,400
workers. Anchor’s corporate headquarters are located in Tampa,
Florida, and it has manufacturing operations in at least 10 other
States. A Canadian firm, Consumers Packaging, Inc. (Consumers)
owned, directly and indirectly, 60 percent of Anchor. Consumers also
owned, directly and indirectly, 80 percent of GGC, L.L.C. (formerly
known as Glenshaw Glass Company, Inc.) (Glenshaw). Glenshaw’s
corporate headquarters are located in Glenshaw, Pennsylvania, and
its only manufacturing operations are in that State. Glenshaw and
its predecessors have been making glass containers since the early
1900’s.
|
|
On May 23, 2001, Consumers filed for protection under the
Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act with the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice. As part of this proceeding, Consumers was
to sell its interests in Anchor and Glenshaw. On April 15, 2002,
Anchor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code for the purpose of confirming its proposed Plan
of Reorganization dated April 15, 2002.
|
|
Both Anchor and Glenshaw had long-standing, single-employer
defined benefit pension plans. The Anchor Glass Container
Corporation Service Retirement Plan (including predecessor plans)
(Anchor Plan) was established in 1955. It provided benefits
primarily to Anchor employees who were members of the GMP or the
American Flint Glass Workers Union (AFGWU).1
The Anchor Plan covered approximately 14,000 participants. As of
December 31, 2001, the Anchor Plan had unfunded vested liabilities
of over $160 million. Similarly, the Glenshaw Glass Company, Inc.
Service Retirement Plan for Hourly Rated Employees (Glenshaw Plan)
provided retirement benefits to Glenshaw employees who were members
of the GMP and the AFGWU. The Glenshaw Plan covered approximately
1,000 participants. As of December 31, 2001, the Glenshaw Plan had
unfunded vested liabilities of over $8 million.
|
|
The Anchor Plan and the Glenshaw Plan were maintained pursuant to
collective bargaining agreements with the GMP and the AFGWU.
Historically, these parties have engaged in collective bargaining
and reached agreements on a wide variety of employment matters,
including employee benefit levels, over the course of several
decades.
|
|
Anchor’s bankruptcy filing occurred, in part, due to its
obligation to fund pension benefits that have increased steadily
during the 1990’s. You indicated that the benefit increases
resulted, in part, from “pattern bargaining” practices in the
glass container industry. You represented that the pattern involves
the GMP negotiating for wages, benefit increases, and other terms
and conditions of employment with the primary employer in the
industry and then seeking to impose those same terms and conditions
when bargaining with the other, generally smaller, employers in the
industry. You indicated that the industry’s primary employer was
willing to agree to regular pension benefit increases because it
could implement those increases for little or no cost due to its
single-employer pension plan being substantially overfunded. You
further indicated that after a decade or so of negotiated pension
benefit increases, Anchor and the GMP agreed that Anchor’s
financial condition would continue to deteriorate if the
pension-related effects of pattern bargaining were not addressed.
|
|
Anchor, Glenshaw, the GMP, and the AFGWU concluded that merging
the Anchor Plan and Glenshaw Plan to establish the Plan as a
multiemployer plan would allow for continuation of pattern
bargaining practices in the industry while ameliorating the
financial effects on the secondary employers arising from the
primary employer agreeing to negotiated increases in pension
benefits. Specifically, with the establishment of the Plan, the GMP
could continue to bargain with the industry’s primary employer on
all employment issues, including pension benefit levels. When an
agreement between those parties was struck, the union could
calculate the actuarial cost of any pension benefit increases,
express that cost as a monthly contribution rate increase, and
negotiate that rate increase with Anchor and Glenshaw. Even though
the Plan would inherit a substantial level of underfunding from the
Anchor and Glenshaw Plans, as participating employers in a
multiemployer plan, Anchor and Glenshaw would be able to limit their
contributions to the Plan to the amounts agreed to in the collective
bargaining process rather than having to make contributions
sufficient to meet the minimum funding requirements otherwise
applicable to the Anchor and Glenshaw Plans as single-employer plans
under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.2
|
|
The Plan was established on December 31, 2001, pursuant to
amendments to existing collective bargaining agreements between
Anchor and Glenshaw and the GMP and the AFGWU. Specifically, the
parties agreed to merge the Glenshaw Plan into the Anchor Plan and,
simultaneously, to establish the Plan by amending and restating the
plan documents. The parties also designated a board of trustees to
assume sponsorship of the Plan and take control of the Plan’s
assets and liabilities. Anchor and the GMP each appointed two
trustees and Glenshaw and the AFGWU each appointed one trustee.
|
|
The Plan is currently funded through contributions from
participating employers and investment earnings. Presently, the only
two participating employers are Anchor and Glenshaw, although you
indicated that the Plan is negotiating with two other unrelated
employers about merging their single-employer pension plans into the
Plan. Under their respective collective bargaining agreements,
Anchor and Glenshaw are required to make monthly contributions based
on a fixed amount per hour of service for each of their covered
employees. In this regard, Anchor’s estimated annual contribution
requirement for 2002 is approximately $12.5 million. But for the
establishment of the Plan, however, Anchor’s accelerated deficit
funding requirement under the Anchor Plan for 2002 would have been
over $80 million. In fact, Anchor’s Disclosure Statement for its
Plan of Reorganization states that, based on certain projections,
without the successful establishment of the Plan as a multiemployer
plan, the Anchor Plan’s underfunding would likely lead “to
accelerated deficit funding requirements of Anchor Glass of $90
million, $40 million and $30 million in 2003, 2004 and 2005,
respectively.”3
|
|
Section 3(37)(A) of ERISA defines the term “multiemployer plan”
to mean a plan to which more than one employer is required to
contribute, which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective
bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations and
more than one employer, and which satisfies such other requirements
as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe by regulation. Additional
requirements were prescribed by regulation at 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-37. Paragraph (c) of § 2510.3-37 provides, with respect to
plans established on or after September 2, 1974, that a plan “must
meet the requirement that it was established for a substantial
business purpose.” In addition to recognizing that “[a]
substantial business purpose includes the interest of a labor
organization in securing an employee benefit plan for its members[,]”
paragraph (c) sets forth four factors to be applied in determining
whether a substantial business purpose exists, noting that any
single factor may be sufficient.
|
|
For purposes of your request, we have assumed that the Plan is a
plan to which more than one employer is required to contribute and
that it is maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements
between one or more employee organizations and more than one
employer. At issue, therefore, is whether the Plan meets the “substantial
business purpose” requirement of the regulation. Consistent with
legislative intent, it has been the Department’s long-standing
position that the establishment of a plan merely to obtain the
statutory advantages of multiemployer plan status will not satisfy
the substantial business purposes test.4
|
|
The four factors described in paragraph (c) of § 2510.3-37 to be
considered in determining “substantial business purpose” are:
(1) the extent to which the plan is maintained by a substantial
number of unaffiliated contributing employers and covers a
substantial portion of the trade, craft or industry in terms of
employees or a substantial number of the employees in the trade,
craft or industry in a locality or geographic area; (2) the extent
to which the plan provides benefits more closely related to years of
service within the trade, craft or industry rather than with an
employer, reflecting the fact that an employee's relationship with
an employer maintaining the plan is generally short-term although
service in the trade, craft or industry is generally long-term; (3)
the extent to which collective bargaining takes place on matters
other than employee benefit plans between the employee organization
and the employers maintaining the plan; and (4) the extent to which
the administrative burden and expense of providing benefits through
single employer plans would be greater than through a multiemployer
plan.
|
|
On the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Plan's establishment, the Department concludes that the Plan’s
establishment as a multiemployer plan does not meet the “substantial
business purpose” requirements of the regulation. With regard to
factor one, it is the view of the Department that the number of
participating employers, under the facts presented, do not
constitute a substantial number of unaffiliated contributing
employers. With regard to factor two, it does not appear that
employee relationships with an employer maintaining the Plan are
generally short-term. With regard to factor three, we note that,
although the sponsoring employers and employee organizations bargain
collectively on a broad range of employment matters, and have done
so over many years, until now, such bargaining has always been in
the context of maintaining single-employer plans. As a result, the
Department can give little weight to this third factor as a basis
for finding that the Plan is a multiemployer plan. Finally, with
regard to factor four, the information provided to us about the
administrative cost of maintaining the Plan relative to maintaining
separate single-employer plans, does not indicate that the
administrative burden and expense of maintaining the single-employer
plans is significantly greater than maintaining a multiemployer
plan. In fact, it appears that some of the projected savings could
be realized through joint management of the single-employer plans.
Moreover, it is difficult for us to conclude, on the basis of the
information provided, that the significant reduction in funding and
liability that would be achieved through operating under the
statutory provisions governing multiemployer plans was not the
primary factor in the establishment of the Plan. For these reasons,
it is the view of the Department that the Plan would not constitute
a “multiemployer plan” within the meaning of section 3(37) of
ERISA.
|
|
This letter constitutes an advisory opinion under ERISA Procedure
76-1 (issued August 27, 1976). Accordingly, this letter is issued
subject to the provisions of that procedure, including section 10
thereof, relating to the effect of advisory opinions.
|
|
1 A plan
covering certain Anchor salaried employees had been merged into the
Anchor Plan in 1998, but the benefit levels in that salaried
employee plan had been frozen since January 1, 1995.
|
|
2 We note that
PBGC’s maximum annual guarantee of benefits applicable to the
Anchor and Glenshaw Plans if they terminated as single employer
plans is currently $42,954. For multiemployer pension plans, the
current monthly guarantee level is 100 percent of the first $11 of
the plan-designated dollar amount multiplied by the participant’s
years of service under the plan plus 75 percent of the next $33 of
the dollar amount multiplied by the participant’s years of
service. Accordingly, the benefit guarantee for a worker with 30
years of service in a multiemployer plan is $1,072.50 per month, or
$12,870 per year.
|
|
3 You recently
indicated that based on recalculations made after filing the Plan of
Reorganization the actual deficit funding requirements, although
still quite substantial, may be lower than the projections in the
Disclosure Statement.
|
|
4 See
H.R. Conf. Report No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. 265 (1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 42234 (Dec. 4, 1974); Advisory
Opinion 83-05A (Jan. 19, 1983).
|
|
|
|